Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
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Publication:2490707
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0610-0zbMath1087.91013OpenAlexW2058740425MaRDI QIDQ2490707
Nicola Persico, Nicolas Sahuguet
Publication date: 18 May 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0610-0
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