Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0612-YzbMath1107.91039OpenAlexW2042234055MaRDI QIDQ2490709

Chien-Liang Chen, Yair Tauman

Publication date: 18 May 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0612-y

zbMATH Keywords

auctionssignaling gamesBayesian equilibriumcollusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request

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