Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007zbMath1122.91032OpenAlexW2013288181MaRDI QIDQ2491028

Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 18 May 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsadverse selectionprice discriminationincentive compatibilitymonopoly pricingmulti-dimensional mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (37)

Adaptive, anisotropic and hierarchical cones of discrete convex functions ⋮ Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis ⋮ Selling two identical objects ⋮ Duality in procurement design ⋮ Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions ⋮ Mixed bundling auctions ⋮ Selling two goods optimally ⋮ Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium ⋮ The optimality of upgrade pricing ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer ⋮ Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach ⋮ Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations ⋮ A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ Pricing lotteries ⋮ On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items ⋮ Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing ⋮ The role of optimal threats in auction design ⋮ Optimal sales mechanism with outside options ⋮ On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ Non-optimality of state by state monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty: an example ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions ⋮ Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods ⋮ The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design ⋮ Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty

Cites Work

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• Haggling over substitutes
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms

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