On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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Publication:2491032
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.001zbMath1125.91019OpenAlexW2134996700MaRDI QIDQ2491032
Publication date: 18 May 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.001
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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