Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal's \(t\)-solutions

DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0003-4zbMath1151.91385OpenAlexW2120764498MaRDI QIDQ2491083

Mark Voorneveld

Publication date: 26 May 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0003-4

zbMATH Keywords

Bounded rationalityQuantal response equilibriumLinear probability model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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