The weak sequential core for two-period economies

DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0007-0zbMath1154.91325OpenAlexW2744561331MaRDI QIDQ2491088

Andrés Perea, Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 26 May 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/64778050/Herings_2006_the_weak_sequential_core.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreassets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (14)

Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game ⋮ Stochastic bankruptcy games ⋮ Node-consistent core for games played over event trees ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Core concepts for incomplete market economies ⋮ Transferable utility games with uncertainty ⋮ Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game ⋮ The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games ⋮ The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty ⋮ Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets ⋮ The weak sequential core for two-period economies ⋮ Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies ⋮ Deviations, uncertainty and the core ⋮ Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games

Cites Work

• The core of a monetary economy without trust
• A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
• Credible coalitions and the core
• The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs
• The Recursive Core
• CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

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