Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
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Publication:2494015
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0620-yzbMath1106.91020OpenAlexW2235081734MaRDI QIDQ2494015
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0620-y
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