How much can taxes help selfish routing?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2495395
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2005.09.010zbMath1103.68018OpenAlexW2150107383MaRDI QIDQ2495395
Yevgeniy Dodis, Tim Roughgarden, Richard John Cole
Publication date: 30 June 2006
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2005.09.010
Related Items (50)
Mechanisms for (mis)allocating scientific credit ⋮ Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism ⋮ Coordination mechanisms ⋮ Adaptive routing with stale information ⋮ Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Unrelated Machine Scheduling ⋮ Toss one's cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting ⋮ Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling ⋮ Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis ⋮ A Selective Tour Through Congestion Games ⋮ A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information ⋮ Network design to anticipate selfish evacuation routing ⋮ Optimal externalities in a parallel transportation network ⋮ Approximating Wardrop equilibria with finitely many agents ⋮ Optimal control of the mean field equilibrium for a pedestrian tourists' flow model ⋮ Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines ⋮ Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors ⋮ Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks ⋮ Transfer implementation in congestion games ⋮ Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand ⋮ Reasoning about Quality and Fuzziness of Strategic Behaviors ⋮ Non-preemptive Coordination Mechanisms for Identical Machine Scheduling Games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Topological implications of selfish neighbor selection in unstructured peer-to-peer networks ⋮ Efficient methods for selfish network design ⋮ A network pricing game for selfish traffic ⋮ Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents ⋮ Inefficiency of Nash equilibria with parallel processing policy ⋮ Non-atomic one-round walks in congestion games ⋮ The minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows ⋮ The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric ⋮ Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution ⋮ Price of anarchy in a linear-state stochastic dynamic game ⋮ Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms ⋮ A selfish routing based network improvement problem ⋮ Congestion games with priority-based scheduling ⋮ On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard ⋮ Non-cooperative cost sharing games via subsidies ⋮ Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria ⋮ Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions ⋮ Price of anarchy in parallel processing ⋮ Equilibrium strategies for multiple interdictors on a common network ⋮ The price of anarchy of affine congestion games with similar strategies ⋮ Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games ⋮ Selfish routing in public services ⋮ Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling ⋮ Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands ⋮ Risk-Averse Selfish Routing ⋮ Management of Variable Data Streams in Networks ⋮ Market inefficiency, entry order and coordination ⋮ Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The directed subgraph homeomorphism problem
- Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control
- On certain connectivity properties of the internet topology
- A survey on networking games in telecommunications
- Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Sensitivity analysis for the asymmetric network equilibrium problem
- Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
- Network-Optimized Road Pricing: Part II: Algorithms and Examples
- Network-Optimized Road Pricing: Part I: A Parable and a Model
- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
This page was built for publication: How much can taxes help selfish routing?
