Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study

DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0024-8zbMath1132.91398OpenAlexW2026944621MaRDI QIDQ2500704

Ayça E. Giritligil Kara, Murat R. Sertel

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0024-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Voting: a machine learning approach ⋮ Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule ⋮ Simultaneous elicitation of scoring rule and agent preferences for robust winner determination ⋮ Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? ⋮ The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures

Cites Work

• Partially monotonic bargaining solutions
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems

This page was built for publication: Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study