Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet

DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0045-3zbMath1132.91403OpenAlexW2029664262MaRDI QIDQ2500711

Mathias Risse

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0045-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Voting: a machine learning approach ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control ⋮ Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect ⋮ Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation ⋮ Is majority consistency possible?

Cites Work

• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• The Borda count and agenda manipulation
• A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
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