The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization

DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0048-0zbMath1132.91393OpenAlexW2058708561MaRDI QIDQ2500712

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0048-0

zbMATH Keywords

scoring ruleapproval votingminimal veto condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (14)

The socially acceptable scoring rule ⋮ The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited ⋮ Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Qualified voting systems ⋮ Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization ⋮ Robustness against inefficient manipulation ⋮ Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context ⋮ The greatest unhappiness of the least number ⋮ A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule ⋮ The greatest unhappiness of the least number ⋮ Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules ⋮ Is majority consistency possible?

Cites Work

• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Basic Geometry of Voting

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