Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0017-6zbMath1118.91008OpenAlexW2103132680MaRDI QIDQ2501069

David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro, Inés Macho-Stadler

Publication date: 4 September 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171296

zbMATH Keywords

CournotCoalition formationBilateral agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES ⋮ Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms

Cites Work

• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation

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