Downsian competition when no policy is unbeatable

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0020-yzbMath1118.91002OpenAlexW2144566110MaRDI QIDQ2501073

Jesper Roine

Publication date: 4 September 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0020-y

zbMATH Keywords

Local equilibriumSpatial trembles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Local equilibria in economic games

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