Banning bidders from all-pay auctions

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0010-5zbMath1097.91039OpenAlexW2000678502MaRDI QIDQ2505517

Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 26 September 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0010-5

zbMATH Keywords

Complete informationExclusion principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Sad-loser contests ⋮ A note on the exclusion principle ⋮ Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: contests and Cournot oligopoly

Cites Work

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• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently

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