Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0003-4zbMath1106.91013OpenAlexW1974062516MaRDI QIDQ2505528

Jun Wako

Publication date: 26 September 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0003-4

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingCoreAssignment gameComplementary slackness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Paths to stability in the assignment problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• On Some Network Flow Games

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