Ascending price Vickrey auctions

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00141-6zbMath1125.91040OpenAlexW2145872399MaRDI QIDQ2506307

Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy

Publication date: 28 September 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00141-6

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingprimal-dual algorithmmulti-object auctionsWalrasian equilibriumassignment modelbuyers are substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Nonconvex equilibrium models for energy markets: exploiting price information to determine the existence of an equilibrium ⋮ An efficient ascending auction for private valuations ⋮ Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming ⋮ A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation ⋮ Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion ⋮ Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items ⋮ Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations ⋮ Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions

Cites Work

• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
• The package assignment model.
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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