Ascending price Vickrey auctions
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Publication:2506307
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00141-6zbMath1125.91040OpenAlexW2145872399MaRDI QIDQ2506307
Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy
Publication date: 28 September 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00141-6
linear programmingprimal-dual algorithmmulti-object auctionsWalrasian equilibriumassignment modelbuyers are substitutes
Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Nonconvex equilibrium models for energy markets: exploiting price information to determine the existence of an equilibrium ⋮ An efficient ascending auction for private valuations ⋮ Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming ⋮ A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation ⋮ Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion ⋮ Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items ⋮ Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations ⋮ Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
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