Efficient priority rules

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009zbMath1125.91033OpenAlexW2132797059MaRDI QIDQ2506315

Bettina Klaus, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 28 September 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptance algorithmpriority rulesindivisible objectsacyclic priority structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (18)

Consistent house allocation ⋮ On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ Local and global consistency properties for student placement ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Fair and efficient student placement with couples ⋮ Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Efficient assignment respecting priorities ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources

Cites Work

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• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
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• Consistency in house allocation problems
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• House allocation with existing tenants
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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