Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.09.004zbMath1184.91023OpenAlexW2059529353MaRDI QIDQ2507235

Takuya Masuzawa, Mikio Nakayama, Toshiyuki Hirai

Publication date: 10 October 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibriacoalition-proof Nash equilibria\(\alpha\)-core\(\beta\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

THE STRATEGIC CORES α, β, γ AND δ ⋮ Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness ⋮ Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad ⋮ Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game

Cites Work

• A geometric approach to a class of equilibrium existence theorems
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium
• Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
• On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Punishment strategies make the \(\alpha\)-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced
• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers

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