Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.011zbMath1177.91074OpenAlexW2050922567MaRDI QIDQ2507680

Diego Moreno, Luis Ubeda

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (6)

Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets ⋮ On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function competition with sunk costs ⋮ Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the arm's length principle ⋮ Competing auctions with endogenous quantities ⋮ Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets ⋮ On the Relationship Between Quantity Precommitment and Cournot Games

Cites Work

• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly.
• Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty

This page was built for publication: Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome