An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.015zbMath1293.91056OpenAlexW3123500833MaRDI QIDQ2511258

Georgy Artemov

Publication date: 5 August 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.015

zbMATH Keywords

social choice rulesvirtual implementationadmissible supportdictatorial rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

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