Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.12.018zbMath1293.91010OpenAlexW1985194038MaRDI QIDQ2512361

Daniel Laskar

Publication date: 7 August 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionambiguitycoordinationfinancial crisesglobal game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity

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