Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2513286
DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0792-0zbMath1306.91065OpenAlexW2052972523WikidataQ109044572 ScholiaQ109044572MaRDI QIDQ2513286
Publication date: 2 February 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0792-0
Related Items (10)
On the implementation of the median ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
Cites Work
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Bayesian Implementation
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
This page was built for publication: Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
