Personalized pricing and advertising: an asymmetric equilibrium analysis
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Publication:2516231
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.006zbMath1318.91077OpenAlexW3125693742MaRDI QIDQ2516231
Simon P. Anderson, Nathan Larson, Alicia Baik
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.006
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