Bribing in second-price auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2516238
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.008zbMath1318.91103OpenAlexW3123511286MaRDI QIDQ2516238
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201107.pdf
Related Items (4)
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Speculation in procurement auctions ⋮ Bribing in team contests ⋮ Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
Cites Work
- Private monitoring in auctions
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Bidder collusion
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Optimal Auction Design
This page was built for publication: Bribing in second-price auctions
