Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
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Publication:2519482
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006zbMath1152.91377OpenAlexW2113611440MaRDI QIDQ2519482
Sergei Severinov, Raymond J. Deneckere
Publication date: 26 January 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006
Related Items (19)
Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Hard evidence and mechanism design ⋮ Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Selling with evidence ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Experimental design to persuade
Cites Work
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Implementation in differential information economies
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
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