The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.003zbMath1152.91357OpenAlexW2138605037MaRDI QIDQ2519491

Emin Dokumacı, William H. Sandholm, Ratul Lahkar

Publication date: 26 January 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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