Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization
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Publication:255113
DOI10.1007/s10957-014-0694-4zbMath1334.91028OpenAlexW38281563WikidataQ107155286 ScholiaQ107155286MaRDI QIDQ255113
Hans Hellendoorn, Noortje Groot, Bart De Schutter
Publication date: 9 March 2016
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-014-0694-4
Decision theory (91B06) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80)
Related Items (5)
Existence and computations of best affine strategies for multilevel reverse Stackelberg games ⋮ Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in games with pay-off functions constructed by minimum convolutions of antagonistic and private criteria ⋮ Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, social welfare and optimal structure in hierarchical continuous public goods game ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization
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Cites Work
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