Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: can we sleep well?

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0897-4zbMath1367.91137OpenAlexW2134138550MaRDI QIDQ255170

F. Blanchet-Sadri, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 9 March 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0897-4

zbMATH Keywords

redistributioncommitmentbank runsoptimal liquidationdeposit insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

Government guarantees and financial stability ⋮ Enriching information to prevent bank runs ⋮ Introduction to the symposium on bubbles, multiple equilibria, and economic activities

Cites Work

• Sustainable plans and debt
• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Bailouts and Financial Fragility

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