The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games

DOI10.1016/0022-2496(73)90018-7zbMath0265.90067OpenAlexW2014237579MaRDI QIDQ2562047

Abraham D. Horowitz

Publication date: 1973

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2496(73)90018-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (8)

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values ⋮ Game theory and power indices ⋮ A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and Shapley models in N-person quota games with one weak player ⋮ Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games ⋮ Notes on Ostrogorski's paradox ⋮ A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model ⋮ The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the kernel of constant-sum simple games with homogeneous weights
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
• A Method for Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games
• The Kernel of m-Quota Games
• On the Enumeration of Majority Games
• On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games
• A game with no solution
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
• Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
• Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}

This page was built for publication: The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games