The principal-agent problem with adaptive players

DOI10.1007/BF01299067zbMath0865.90147MaRDI QIDQ2563563

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 16 December 1996

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityprincipal-agent theoryobject-oriented computer simulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Satisficing
• On the allocation of effort
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance

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