Independent social choice correspondences

DOI10.1007/BF00134113zbMath0870.90013MaRDI QIDQ2563808

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 16 December 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives conditionfixed agenda social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Collective choice rules with social maximality ⋮ An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions

Cites Work

• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Revealed preference and demand correspondences
• Social choice in economic environments
• Never choose the uniquely largest. A characterization
• Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Social choice with analytic preferences
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
• Internal Consistency of Choice

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