Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample

DOI10.1007/BF02192256zbMath0866.90142WikidataQ124966527 ScholiaQ124966527MaRDI QIDQ2565010

A. J. Vermeulen, M. J. M. Jansen

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

proper equilibriastrategic stabilitybimatrix gamesstrictly perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (4)

Fall back equilibrium for \(2 \times n\) bimatrix games ⋮ Fall back equilibrium ⋮ Continuity and equilibrium stability ⋮ The trembling chairman paradox

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On strictly proper equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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