Asymmetric population games and the legacy of Maynard Smith: From evolution to game theory and back?

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2004.11.003zbMath1071.01508OpenAlexW2029080830WikidataQ48620829 ScholiaQ48620829MaRDI QIDQ2565655

Ilan Eshel

Publication date: 28 September 2005

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2004.11.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Bimatrix replicator dynamics with periodic impulses ⋮ Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated hawk-dove game ⋮ The iterated hawk-dove game revisited: the effect of ownership uncertainty on bourgeois as a pure convention

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• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
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• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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