A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

DOI10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7zbMath1358.91010OpenAlexW1130786658MaRDI QIDQ256597

M. Josune Albizuri, J. M. Echarri, José Manuel Zarzuelo

Publication date: 9 March 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesShapley valuecost allocationairport problemNash programnoncooperative mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game ⋮ Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods

Cites Work

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• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
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• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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