Information security investment for competitive firms with hacker behavior and security requirements

DOI10.1007/S10479-015-1925-2zbMath1358.91081OpenAlexW604628271MaRDI QIDQ256635

Weijun Zhong, Xing Gao

Publication date: 9 March 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1925-2

zbMATH Keywords

information securitymass attackssecurity requirementstargeted attacks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Cryptography (94A60) Mathematical economics (91B99) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (7)

A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments ⋮ A game of information security investment considering security insurance and complementary information assets ⋮ Competitive information security investment under hacker knowledge dissemination ⋮ When Hackers Err: The Impacts of False Positives on Information Security Games ⋮ Open Source or Closed Source? A Competitive Analysis with Software Security ⋮ Information security decisions for two firms in a market with different types of customers ⋮ Managing Security Outsourcing in the Presence of Strategic Hackers

Cites Work

• Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty
• A differential game approach to information security investment under hackers' knowledge dissemination
• Enterprise risk management: a DEA VaR approach in vendor selection
• Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge
• Guest editorial

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