Computational complexity in the design of voting rules

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9422-7zbMath1378.91021OpenAlexW2150100569MaRDI QIDQ256771

Akira Tanaka, Koji Takamiya

Publication date: 10 March 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/63933

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycomputational complexityNP-completenesscoreNakamura numbersimple game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core

Cites Work

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• Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
• Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Computational Complexity

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