Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence

DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9493-0zbMath1378.91043OpenAlexW2185949019MaRDI QIDQ256784

Claudine Desrieux, Jean Beuve

Publication date: 10 March 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9493-0

zbMATH Keywords

experimentrepeated gamescooperationcontractual incompletenessreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence

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