A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
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Publication:2568847
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0214-1zbMath1073.91545OpenAlexW2072100905MaRDI QIDQ2568847
Publication date: 19 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/271
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