Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.007zbMath1094.91004OpenAlexW2017557563MaRDI QIDQ2569388

Carles Rafels, Francesc Llerena, Josep Maria Izquierdo

Publication date: 27 October 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.007

zbMATH Keywords

orderingcorereduced gamesequentially compatible payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Reduced games and egalitarian solutions

Cites Work

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• Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Order independent equilibria
• Cores of convex games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Cores of games with restricted cooperation
• Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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