A defense the Kripkean account of logical truth in first-order modal logic

DOI10.1007/s10992-005-2273-5zbMath1083.03014OpenAlexW2081247553MaRDI QIDQ2572385

Matthew William McKeon

Publication date: 8 November 2005

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-2273-5

zbMATH Keywords

first-order modal logiclogical truth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cites Work

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• On the primary and secondary semantics of logical necessity
• Logical atomism, nominalism, and modal logic
• The fallacies of the new theory of reference
• Validity in intensional languages: A new approach
• A completeness theorem in modal logic
• Which modal logic is the right one?

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