A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
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Publication:2572441
DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0198-4zbMath1099.91042OpenAlexW1999806881MaRDI QIDQ2572441
Publication date: 9 November 2005
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0198-4
efficiencystrategy-proofnessanonymitypluralityseparable preferencesdivision indifferencerestricted efficiency
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