Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model

DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0535-zzbMath1116.91338OpenAlexW3126139843MaRDI QIDQ2572498

Erwan Quintin, Cyril Monnet

Publication date: 10 November 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp126.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Costly state verificationDynamic contractsMonitoring.Theory of uncertainty and information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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