Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.018zbMath1332.91016OpenAlexW1971460267MaRDI QIDQ257250

Manuel A. Mosquera, Jeroen Kuipers, José Manuel Zarzuelo

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1180

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryShapley valuenucleolushighway games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (11)

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state ⋮ A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems ⋮ The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ An exact decomposition method to save trips in cooperative pickup and delivery based on scheduled trips and profit distribution ⋮ Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game ⋮ Cost Allocation in Common Facilities Sharing ⋮ Horizontal cooperation in a multimodal public transport system: the profit allocation problem ⋮ On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems ⋮ Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods ⋮ Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games ⋮ A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

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