Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2005.03.002zbMath1095.91006OpenAlexW3123212314MaRDI QIDQ2575844

Amnon Rapoport, Wilfred Amaldoss, James E. Parco

Publication date: 7 December 2005

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2005.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

ExperimentTournamentContestRent-seekingEWATwo-stage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (10)

Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence ⋮ An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study ⋮ Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests ⋮ Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach ⋮ Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? ⋮ Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests ⋮ Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests

Cites Work

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• Dynamic rent-seeking games
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
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• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Curvature of the Probability Weighting Function
• The Probability Weighting Function
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games

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