College admissions with affirmative action
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Publication:2576650
DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7zbMath1086.91049OpenAlexW2164712528MaRDI QIDQ2576650
Publication date: 14 December 2005
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7
Related Items (32)
When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? ⋮ Fair implementation of diversity in school choice ⋮ Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Constrained school choice ⋮ The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice ⋮ Matching through institutions ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Beyond submodularity: a unified framework of randomized set selection with group fairness constraints ⋮ The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market ⋮ School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules ⋮ School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action ⋮ Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts ⋮ On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures ⋮ Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints ⋮ Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment ⋮ School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences ⋮ Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach ⋮ On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts ⋮ College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity
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