Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
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Publication:2577439
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.015zbMath1127.91010OpenAlexW1973080038MaRDI QIDQ2577439
Publication date: 22 December 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.015
2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (22)
Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games ⋮ Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality ⋮ On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ The logic of backward induction ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ Common belief in future and restricted past rationality ⋮ Perfect forward induction ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Mutually acceptable courses of action ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
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