Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.003zbMath1127.91004OpenAlexW2162605677MaRDI QIDQ2577443

William H. Sandholm, Jeffrey C. Ely

Publication date: 22 December 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.212.1615

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (22)

Approachability in population games ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab ⋮ Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games ⋮ Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution ⋮ Reinforcement learning in population games ⋮ Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games ⋮ Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules ⋮ Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching ⋮ Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria ⋮ Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Tempered best response dynamics ⋮ On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples ⋮ Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation ⋮ On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information ⋮ Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation ⋮ Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples

Cites Work

• Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Learning purified mixed equilibria
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
• Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
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