Consequences of reversing preferences
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Publication:2580249
DOI10.1007/BF02984858zbMath1266.91022OpenAlexW2028400863MaRDI QIDQ2580249
Donald G. Saari, Steven Barney
Publication date: 2003
Published in: The Mathematical Intelligencer (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02984858
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