Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
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Publication:2580968
DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4zbMath1087.91014OpenAlexW2044720834MaRDI QIDQ2580968
Martin Barbie, Attila Tasnádi, Clemens D. Puppe
Publication date: 10 January 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/218/1/Barbie_Puppe_Tasnadi_ET_2006_v27_p411.pdf
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