Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.08.002zbMath1117.91378OpenAlexW2018090886MaRDI QIDQ2581789

Rose-Anne Dana, Guillaume Carlier

Publication date: 10 January 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5371

zbMATH Keywords

SupermodularityRearrangementsFirst-order approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (11)

Rearrangement inequalities in non-convex insurance models ⋮ Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system ⋮ Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem ⋮ Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ OPTIMAL INSURANCE DESIGN UNDER RANK‐DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Equimeasurable Rearrangements with Capacities ⋮ The optimal insurance policy for the general fixed cost of handling an indemnity under rank-dependent expected utility

Cites Work

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• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• An Inequality for Rearrangements

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